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THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
Democratic 'checks and balances'• 
AUSTIN G. BENClNl 
IN July 1976, the United States of America will be celebrating the 
bicentenary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence 
and, naturally, a whole nation will be nostalgically reviewing the 
many landmarks which colour and give meaning to the two hundred 
years of United States history. As usually happens on such occa-
sions, special attention will be devoted co the very origins of the 
United States and, no doubt, also to the day when the thirteen re-
bellious former British colonial settlements took the plunge and 
decided to draft a constitution that would unite this nation, still in 
its early stages of existence, as well as to its eventual develop-
ment into the really democratic and, at the same time, practical in-
strument of government which America has today. 
The thirteen states had already been eleven years independent 
when delegates representing these States met in Philadelphia in 
1787, giving life to the Convention whose cask was that of correct-
ing the shortcomings of the articles of confederation v; hich had 
been existing since the Declaration of Independence. 
It was generally fe It that the Artie les of Confederation gave too 
much importance to the states, with the consequence that the un-
ion would practically be non-existent, especially when the main 
factor which had kept them together, the common struggle against 
the British, no longer existed once they had freed themselves from 
British domination; hence, the need was felt for a fundamental law 
that would unite the states into one country, a union whereby each 
state would have its main interests protected, but which would 
make their interest converge in the government of the United States 
of America. 
The delegates, after many compromises, managed to draft a con-
stitution, federal in nature, providing for a Presidential Executive 
system, with a legislature, composed of two houses, and a federal 
judiciary, composing the three main organs of central federal au-
thority, with each state having its own elected legislature andgo-
•This Article states the position as at the 20th September 1974. 
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vernor. 
The tFoundiog Fathers' of the American Constitution had one 
major problem to solve, namely, that of trying to constitute an effi-
cient political system with the necessary constitutional safeguards 
to prevent it from endangering the liberties which the Americans 
had acquired at such a high cost of human Ii ves. It is this aspect 
of the United States Constitution which I intend to analyse and I 
am going to do so for two reasons: the first being that this is the 
fundamental characteristic of the constitution; secondly, that the 
American Constitution happens to be the first constitution to be 
drafted to meet these specific requirements. 
Th us, the t Founding Fathers' decided to build the Coos titution 
on the so-called doctrines of the 'separation of powers, and that of 
the constitutional 'checks and balances'. These two doctrines pro-
pounded by such eminent writers as Montesquieu, Locke and Adams 
were contained in a formula through which the relations of the Exe-
cutive, Legislature and Judiciary, according to the first doctrine, 
would avoid the concentration of too much power in the hands of 
one organ, by giving each organ a definite clear cue sphere for 
which ic, and only it, would be responsible. On the other hand, ac-
cording to the doctrine of the 'checks and balances', each organ 
should have enough means ·to control the others, should one of them 
abuse its powers. We shall now pass on to analyse how the 'Found-
ing Fathers' dealt with the problem. 
Ac the Convention, after much debate, it was decided that the 
National Executive should be in the hands of one man, namely, the 
United States President. His powers are not clearly defined in the 
Constitution, but as Article 2, section 1 states, his main function 
is that of Chief Executive of the United States Government. His 
powers are, indeed, separated, for he is independent from Congress, 
in the sense chat his stay at the White House is not dire~tly depen· 
dent on Congress, as the President is elected on a nationwide ba-
sis for a period of four years. 
Originally, the President would be re-elected indefinitely but 
this situation was changed by the 22nd Amendment which limited 
the President's stay at the White House to two terms. 
The President, as head of the Executive, cannot legislate, and 
this factor has given rise · to a very complicated state of affairs 
~here, on account of the 'checks' of the Legislature on the Presi· 
dent, a continual struggle arises between these two organs. 
In these last 30 years, that is before Watergate, the President 
had managed to take the initiative by exploiting his conscituciona~ 
role as chief policy maker. Ia face, it is interesting to note that 
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from the Constitutional point of view, the Preside at' s Position has 
not changed, no matter how his power happened to be influenced 
by the political climate of the day: he always embodies the unity 
of the ·United States: as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
he can ignite an atomic holocaust. Yet, despite his tremendous po-
wer, the Constitution makes of the Chief Executive a very poor 
man as be depends totally on Congress for his finances, whilst his 
measures require their approval by Congress for them to become 
law. 
The President's predicament was reflected very clearly by Pre-
sident Kennedy when, although enjoying a Democratic majority in 
Congress, he complained that his majority which existed on paper, 
rarely materialised in reality, for although the Democrats out n um-
bered the Republicans by 263 members to 214 in the House of Rep-
resentatives and by 64 to 35 in the Senate, as Kennedy himself 
pointed out 'some Democrats have voted Republican for 25 years 
and that makes it very .difficult to secure the enactment of any con-
troversial legislation.' One can imagine the problems which a Pre-
sident faces when faced by a hostile Congress, as often is the 
case. 
This situation is indeed strange, to say the least, to any one 
who is used to the rigid party policies and party discipline gene-
rally followed in a parliamentary democracy, but the American par· 
ty structure is weakened by many factors, ooe of which is the fact 
that United States Congress is federally based, with the conse-
quence that the party members prefer satisfying a highly demand-
ing constituency than a party whip; after all, the party system was 
not envisaged by the 'Founding Fathers'. 
We have considered how the President can find in Congress a 
check to his powers. We shall now consider how a strong President 
not weakened by Vietnam Wars and Watergate scandals can fulfill. 
his role also as leader of the Legislature. 
Arc. II Section Ill of the Constitution states that the President: 
'shall, from time co time, give to ·congress information of the state 
of the Union and recommend such measures as he shall judge ne· 
cessary and expedient'. Here, we have the national Leader addres-
sing himself to Congress, but this does not necessarily mean that 
every legislative proposal recommended by him to Congress origi-
nates in the mind of the President or even within the confines of 
the White House. Most proposals, in fact, come from agencies of 
government and from interest groups. What the President does is 
to determine priorities and to focus attention and pressure on the 
high priority measures. 
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Theo, we have the powerful weapon of the Presidential veto. 
Now, although the veto is, indeed, a significant constitutional le-
ver in the President's .hands, it is, however, of a negative charac-
ter. The President, according to the Constitution, has 10 days in 
which to return a Bill to Congress with his objections pointed out. 
Congress, however, can override the Presidential veto, if it can 
muster a two-thirds majority; infact, herein lies the efficacy of his 
'check 1 , for the President, normally can -rally one-third of Con-
gress to defeat the counter measure of Congress. Indeed, the fact 
that Congress possesses a . sufficient democratic overall majority 
to defeat a Presidential veto, as was recently seen in the vital' 
Turkish arms deal, is sufficient proof co show the hard times the 
Chief Executive can go through. 
The President has also the power to call special sessions of 
Congress. This power has been used, on occasion, to meet parti-
cular emergencies; it has often been used as a political weapon to 
focus attention on Presidential programmes. 
In the system of 1checks and balances' the President's main 
contact is with the Legislature, but ~ e muse not forget that the 
President also nominates judges who have to be approved by Con-
gress. As yet, the President's main influence and his main head-
aches are mainly found in Congress, a Congress that had been re-
legated for a long time to the background of the United States poli-
tics by the emergence of the so-called 1 Imperial Presidency' but 
Congress is trying to recover a lot of the ground it has lost, now 
that the Executive has lost most of its credibility and its political 
support. 
Now we shall analyse how Congress can utilise its checks on 
the President to assert its newly found authority. In the constitu-
tional convention, the 1 Founding Fathers' were presented with 
two plans of how to constitute the national legislature. One was 
the so-called 1 Virginia Plan' which provi~ed for a bicameral le-
gislature with population representation in both Houses; whilst the 
other was the -,New Jersey Plan' which provided for a unicameral 
body with equal representation of the states. The result of this 
controversy was a compromise, namely, to-create a bicameral Con-
gress, with a House of Representatives based on population and a 
Senate based upon equal state representation - two from each 
state. Thus, the equal representation of the states in the United 
States Senate illustrates the practical application of the federal 
principle of the Constitution; the population representation in the 
House of Representatives reflects the centralising ideology of the 
'Founding Fathers' of the Constitution and their recognition of the 
democratic spirit. 
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Congress's main fuoctioo, of course, is that of legislating as 
we 11 as that of levying taxes and making appropriations. The Con-
stitution allows Congress to recommend constitutional amendments 
by a two-thirds majority in each House; at the request of two· thirds 
of the states, Congress <shall call a convention for proposing 
amendments'. Furthermore, Congress has authority to supervise 
the administration, a function which, incidentally, is not explicitly 
granted by the Constitution, but can be implied from the impeach-
ment authority, senatorial power and the need to investigate the 
implementation of legislation. Congress also has che responsibility 
in d~e judicial_ sphere as, for example, the approval or otherwise of 
judicial appointments and the establishment of Federal Courts 
(other than the Federal Supreme Court). 
A vital role in the <checks and balances' of the Legislature on 
the Executive is played by the Committees of Congress. They play 
such a significant role that a further illustration of their structure, 
especially since they are so different from the Committee structure 
in our Parliamenta~y system, is, in my opinion, vital to understand 
Executive-Legislative relations. 
The Committee stage in a Parliamentary system of the Westmins· 
ter model does not play such a vital role in the legislative process 
for the simple reason that the political parties are strong and uni-
fied and exercise a considerable whip-hand in Parliament. Thus, 
the Standing Committees are large; they lack a continuing jurisdic· 
tion over specific substantive areas and furthermore, have a fluc-
tuating member ship. This weakness is reflected by the fact that 
the Committees are not sources of power but vehicles for detailed 
work. 
By contrast, the Congressional Committees are not s..o strongly 
dominated by party considerations. In fact, it has been suggested 
that the Committee structure is one of the reasons why the parties 
in the United States are not so powerful as one would think them 
· to be. The Congressional Committee is a strong, proud and inde-
pendent unit; ~he senior members of Committees have often served 
20 years or more, long enough, that is, to have become experts in 
the field. They are capable, therefore, of tackling the increasing 
complexities of modern legislation and of holding their own in any 
encounter with officials of the Executive Departments. The Com-
mittees are very touchy on their jurisdictional prerogatives. The po· 
wer of the Congressional Committee mainly lies in the fact that it 
has the faculty of determining what Bills will be reported out and 
which will be delayed or even <buried' in obscurity; furthermore, 
Congressional rules and traditions offer only the narrowest of op-
portunities for a Congressional majority to 'disinter: a Bill that 
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has been buried in Committee. 
As a !ready pointed out above, party allegiances are very often 
put aside and party lines are often crossed, for the legislator may 
have to lobby for important state interests which may not be con-
vergent with his leader's position. Another factor which contributes 
to the power of the Committees is the so-called minority system 
through which the powerful post of the Committee Chairman is 
elected. This system frequently promotes to the chairmanship a 
man who is out of step with the opinion of his party with respect 
to the issues under his jurisdiction, yet the seniority tradition 
protects him from the loss of his post, however heretical his views 
may be. However, there is a strong drive, especially among young 
democrats, to change the seniority system. 
It is amazing how much the American legislative process and 
the relations between the Executive and the Legislature depend on 
the Committee Chairman: his position is a very powerful one. He 
has the sole power to call meetings in some Committees and, in 
all of them, he can call, or refuse to call, additional meetings be-
yond those scheduled, and can determine the schedule of hearings. 
This powerful gentlem·an with, at least, the tacit connivance of 
some members, can prevent another member from gaining a vote on 
a Bill; but his strongest advantage on the Committee lies . in the 
fact that he is a very experienced person who has more information 
and understanding about the measures coming before the Commit-
tee than anyone else. This advantage is not only pressed home 
against his Committee members, but also in dealing with adminis· 
trative officials; his knowledge and experience force administra-
tive officials to respect his views. A disadvantage in this struc-
ture arises when the post of Chairman is occupied by a weak le-
gislator and this is, indeed, no small eventuality owing to the 
above mentioned seniority system, for this could create. a danger· 
-c,-u5- power vacuum, with no member able to lead the Committee, for 
he would lack the prerogative of the Chairman. 
It is of vital importance to understand the way Committees func-
tion, because they are of great importance in the ~xecutive-Legis­
lative relations which are being analysed in the light of their res-
pective 'checks and balances'. Thus, one of the most substantial 
and detailed legislative supervisions of Executive agencies is the 
area of fiscal control, the central processes of which are the au· 
thorisation for the expenditure of funds, the appropriation of funds 
and the audit or review of their actual expenditure. At the Congres-
sional level, the primary units for fiscal supervision are the Appro· 
priation Committees. 
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Another device used by Congress to check the Executive is the 
so-called Committee investigations which have come into the lime-
light since the Second World War, especially after the so-called 
Army-McCarthy Hearings in 1954. Most of the investigations have a 
distinctive and legitimate legislative purpose; however, some Con-
gressional investigations provide a means by which the Commit-
tees can supervise Executive agencies, examining their implemen-
tation of delegated power in particular circumstances. Unfortu-
nately, this 1 check' on the Executive sometimes acquires a parti-
san flavour, especially when elections are approaching, particular-
ly when Congress is conuolled by the opposite party, but these 
enquir~es are, on the whole, very positive. Their value has been 
demonstrated during the Watergate Scandal and its aftermath. First 
of all, we have the Senate Watergate Committee chaired by Sena-
tor Erwin, that played a prominant part in the investigations; then, 
we had the judiciary Committee voting that proceedings be com-
menced against President Nixon in the House of Representatives, 
and even more recently, we have a Committee investigating C.I.A. 
activities, an enquiry surrounded by controversy. It can be easily 
seen that this is a major weapon in the system of the 'checks and 
balances' in the United States system. 
Perhaps the most direct and visible control over Administrative 
organisation and procedure has been the so-called 'legislative ve-
to'. A case that could be cited in the field of executive re-organi-
sation, is the 1932 Re-organisation law, in which Congress ·re-
quired that a President's re-organisation plans be submitted to 
Congress 60 days before going into effect, subject to disapproval 
by either House. 
Another important method of control is the legislature's approval 
of appointment. The United State's Senate gives its advice and 
consent to thousands of appointments, most of them routine. The 
Senators' interest in the average appointment is limited to preserv-
ing their control over patronage thr'ough the technique of 'senator· 
ial courtesy'. Occasionally, with respect to more important ap-
pointments, senators question the competence or suitability of a 
nominee or point out possible conf~icts of interest resulting from 
his appointment. 
The ultimate and most important 'check' of the Legislature over 
the Executive is its const~tutional power to impeach the Chief 
Executive, the President, should he over-reach his constitutional 
powers or in the case of misconduct. 
As already mentioned above, one of the most imponant 'checks' 
which the Legislature has over the Executive is that Congress 
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controls the finances so badly needed by the Execuci ve. This does 
not only help Congress to keep an eye on the executive, but it en-
ables ic also to share in the country's policy making and, at this 
particular historical moment, this weapon could prove to be the de-
cisive one in the Legislature's come back. One of the most glaring 
examples is the recent Trade Reform Act, where Congress, mainly 
through the amendments proposed by Senator Jackson, amended the 
Soviet-American Trade Agreement to such an extent that the deal 
had to be called off, for it proved unacceptable to the Soviet Un-
ion. Congress again <checked' the Presidential foreign policy by 
refusing him the necessary funds to supply Turkey with arms. 
It seems clear chat the United States is fac~ng a constitutional 
crisis, as, prior to Watergate and Vietnam, the United States Pre-
sident was the chief policy maker; but the consequent loss of con-
fidence in the White House, following Vietnam but particularly Wa-
tergate, has encouraged Congress (especially after the two-thirds 
majority obtained by the Democrats recently) to regain the pre-
viously lose ground, and the so-called 'Imperial Presidency' is de-
finitely no longer applicable, at any rate, for the time being. 
Yee the situation, constitutionally speaking, is awkward. Sena-
tor Javics reflected the situation admirably when he said that 'we 
have half the authority and now we are called on to have half the 
responsibility', but the Senator expressed his doubts whether Con-
gress would live up co this responsibility, as it is not really built 
to lead and take policy initiative in foreign affairs. It can investi-
gate, it can use its financial power and it can restrain the Presi· 
dency from over-reaching itself, but it is top-heavy for policy mak-
ing. The point is proved by ~e fact that there are five Congres-
sional Committees which influence foreign policy, one of the ~pher­
es most hotly contested between the Executive and the Legislature. 
Having analysed the ways in which the doctrine of the 'separa-
don of powers' and of the 'c.heck and balances' operat~ between 
the Executive and the Legislature, ic is now appropriate.to see how 
the Judiciary fits into the picture. Some of the 'Founding Fathers' 
felt that a strong Legislature would call for the combined powers 
of the executive and of the judiciary to control it. Fortunately, this 
proposal was not accepted as the Presidency would alway's have at 
its disposal the <power of veto' and ic was .felt that the Judiciary 
had to be independent in order to fulfill its function properly. 
In fact, in comparison with the Executive and the Legislature, 
the Federal Judiciary is considerably free from any 1checks' which 
would endanger its independence; the few 'checks' co which the 
Federal Judiciary is subject are: the Judges are nominated by tµe 
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President whilst they are subject to approval by Congress, ~hich 
has also the responsibility of establishing Federal Courts, except 
the supreme Court. The latter Court, however, is not empowered by 
the American Constitution with any powerful 'checks' which it 
could utilise over the other two organs: in other words, it is not 
empowered by the Constitution to declare legislative acts or exe-
cutive measures as unconstitutional in the way that, say, the Mal-
tese Constitutional Co\lrt is. 
The Supreme Court ·took its function as guardian a.nd interpreter 
of the Constitution on its own initiative, as a consequence of the 
celebrated case 'Marbury vs. Madison'. Nor does the Constitution 
authorise the Supreme Court to negative acts of the state legis la-
rure, a power which it acquired through the Federal Judiciary Act 
of 1789. In 1914 the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
was enlarged to permit it to pass on state acts which state Courts 
had condemned as against the Federal Constitution. 
Thus, the Supreme Court, through its many Constitutional deci-
sions, in practice, has proved to be a guarantee of American de-
mocracy through its power to review and interpret it aod not through 
constitutional 'checks' on the Executive and on the Legislative or-
gans. The Court takes special care to enforce the Civil Rights pro-
visions which were incorporated in the Constitution in the form of 
amendment. 
Let us now ~~nsider a few cases which illustrate the Supreme 
Court's function as a democratic 'check'. 
" The decisions of the Supreme Court can have a very important 
effect even in the structure of the two organs. One such case con-
cerns the question of 'malapportionment'. On March 26, 1962, the 
Court delivered a controversial decision of far-reaching implica-
tion in a Tennessee case (Baker v. Carr) involvmg appointment of 
the state legis la:ture. I ts background was the malapporcionment of 
state legislatures, ensuing in a general inflated over-representa-
tion of rural and small town voters at the expense of large cities 
and their suburbs. The implication of this fact is of considerable 
importance, in view of the fact that the unrepresentative state le-
gislatures have the responsibility for apportioning Congressional 
districts in their state, with the consequence that this rural domi-
nance is reflected in Congress also. The results of this malappor-
tionment speak for themselves: before 1 Baker v. Carr', in 27 stat-
es there had been no redis~icting for at least 25 years. It was es-
timated that in 24 states a majority in the state legislature could 
elected by less than 40 per cent of the population; in other states, 
the percentage was considerably less. 
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Hence, in 'Baker v. Carr' a number of Tenneessee voters lodged 
a complaint against the denia 1 of the guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to 'equal protection of the law'. Now, the Court's de· 
cision set at rest a single question: that the right to equal protec-
tion under apportionment la'\l;s is within the reach of judicial pro· 
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, however, did 
not enter into the complicated electoral details of the matter, or in-
to which factors could warrant exception to it or whether this stan-
dard should apply to both Houses of Legislature. 
The first c !ear indication of the Supreme Court's approach to-
wards apportionment standards came in March 1963 when it inva-
lidated the Georgia County Unit system used in Primary Elections. 
Justice Douglas said: 'The conception of political equality from 
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg address 
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendment can mean 
only one thing: One man, one vote'. The Court thus, started to eli-
minate apportionment which gave too little cons ideracion to popu-
lation. 
Another important function of the Court is the protection of mi-
norities and co see that their constitutional rights are duly safe· 
guarded; this is, especially so, in the case of black discrimination, 
which, especially in the South, is so very difficult to eradicate. 
An important consticutiona 1 dee is ion was reached in the case of 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ( 1954). The Supreme Court 
ruled in this case chat segregation is discriminatory. The Court 
reasoned 'does segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
'tangible' factor may be equal, deprive the children of the minority 
group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does., 
The Court further found that the 'policy of separating the races is 
usually int~rpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A 
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.' The 
Court also declared that 'separate educational facilities are inhe-
rently unequal' and the negro children were he id to be deprived 
thereby 'of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment., 
As the Mitchells say in their book 'A Biography of the Constitu-
tion of the United States': 'the Supreme Court ban on segregation 
in public schools marked the beginning of a new phase in the pro-
gress of American democracy: the legal removal of rac ia I barriers 
in many other areas of our society., 
The Supreme Court does not hesitate to declare executive mea·-
sures to be unconstitutional whatever their political importance. 
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One of the best cases to prove this is that of <Schechter v. United 
States' (1935). ·The period was that of the <Great Depression', 
where the United States, still in the depth of the depression, elect-
ed Franklin D. Rossevelt to lead the country in the task of the 
great economic recovery. Roosevelt immediately showed that he 
intended taking the bull by the horns: he started, through determin-
ed legislative and executive actions, to issue a stream of laws 
and orders from the White House with the intention of setting the 
economic recovery on its way. Amongst the measures taken was 
the National Indus~ial Recovery Act which went against the eco· 
nomic policy of the day by allowing businessmen to associate to-
gether; .the Act also provided that competition should be dampened 
by punishing so-called 'price cutters', <wage-cutters' and anyone 
giving special service and privileges to favoured customers. The 
Code eventually became law following approval by Roosevelt and 
everybody in the governed group was bound to conform with it or 
be subject to be fined for breach thereof. 
In cschechter v. United States' Schechter was accused by the 
Code authority of infringing the Code. When the case reached the 
Supreme Court, two points were considered, namely, whether the 
activities of the live poultry industry of New York City, which was 
subject to the Code, was involved in inter-state commer<;e, for, if 
it were, it would fall under the jurisdiction of Congress; the se· 
cond concerned the delegation of legislative power to the Presi-
dent who, by approving the Code, gave it the force of Law. 
The Court's decision in both cases went against the Unit~d 
States Government, whilst on the second point the Court decla~d 
that Congress had not been sufficiently specific in directing how 
the power delegated to the president was to be exercised by him. 
Congress could not give up its legislative role transferring to the 
President •an unfettered discretion to make whatever l~w s h.~ 
thinks may be needed'. The statute 1 instead of prescribing rul~s Qf 
conduct ••• authorises the making of codes to prescribe them', The 
Supreme Court held that the act as it stood was unconstituciQn.al 
in that Congress in failing to specify the requisite guide lin.~s tQ 
an administrative agency, through the President, gave altogc-th~t 
too much liberty. This decision made the National Industrial Re-. 
covery Act ineffective, with the result that Roosevelt's measures 
were weakened. Although he expressed the desire to re·organise 
the Supreme Court, so as to make it more receptive to his needs, 
he refrained from doing so. 
The Supreme Court, through a series of constitutional decisions, 
has been a highly responsible protector and interpreter of the 
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Constitution, always ready to safeguard the Rule of Law and to 
eliminate arbitrariness so far as it lay in its power. The prestige 
of the Federal Judiciary was enhanced through its part in dealing 
with the Watergate Scandal. Al'W·ays probing for the truth, the Fe-
deral Judiciary refused to allow the truth to be concealed under 
the term 'Executive Privilege, and, hence, ordered President Nix-
on ro hand to the Court the Watergate tapes. 
American citizens can, indeed look at the American Constitution 
with its democratic safeguards as one of the most noteworthy Ame-
can achievements. The fact that public opinion, Congress and the 
Federal Courts forced the President to climb down and, eventual· 
ly, to resign shows that the Constitutional system, with its democ· 
ratic 1checks and balances' under the protection of an-independent 
judiciary ensuring its safeguards and interpretation, proved its ef· 
ficacy and re liability at the very moment when disillusion with the 
political system could not be stronger. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Malcolm E.: Jewell/Samuel C. Patterson: The Legislative Process 
in the United States. 
Broadus and Louise Mitchell: r\ Biography of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
Louis W. Koenig: The Chie j Executive. 
25 
